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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: Interpersonal difficulties are common in depression, but their 
underlying mechanisms are not yet fully understood. The role of depression in the identification 
of mixed emotional signals with a direct interpersonal value remains unclear. The present study 
aimed to clarify this question. Methods: A sample of 39 individuals reporting a broad range of 
depression levels completed an emotion identification task where they viewed faces expressing 
three emotional categories (100% disgusted and 100% happy faces, as well as their morphed 50% 
disgusted – 50% happy exemplars). Participants were asked to identify the corresponding 
depicted emotion as “clearly disgusted”, “mixed”, or “clearly happy”. Results: Higher depression 
levels were associated with lower identification of positive emotions in 50% disgusted – 50% 
happy faces. Limitations: The study was conducted with an analogue sample reporting individual 
differences in subclinical depression levels. Further research must replicate these findings in a 
clinical sample and clarify whether differential emotional identification patterns emerge in 
depression for different mixed negative-positive emotions (sad-happy vs. disgusted-happy). 
Conclusions: Depression may account for a lower bias to perceive positive states when 
ambiguous states from others include subtle signals of social threat (i.e., disgust), leading to an 
under-perception of positive social signals.  
 
Keywords: Depression; cognitive biases; emotional identification; interpersonal functioning; 
mixed emotions 
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1. Introduction 
Depression is characterized by the experience of difficulties in social interactions (Gotlib 
& Hammen, 2002). Depressed individuals tend to perceive social interactions as negative and to 
attribute the negative outcomes derived from these interactions to themselves (Beck, Rush, Shaw, 
& Emery, 1979; Joiner & Coyne, 1999). Such interpersonal dysfunctions may contribute to both 
the development and maintenance of depression (Rudolph, 2009), being associated with sustained 
negative affect and post-event rumination on negative outcomes (e.g., Kashdan & Roberts, 2007). 
Current research is aimed to understand the mechanisms that may underlie such interpersonal 
difficulties. Cognitive models of depression (e.g., Beck, 2008) posit that information processing 
biases for positive and negative information play a critical role in the disorder, and may underlie 
interpersonal difficulties experienced by depressed individuals (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992). 
Supporting this assumption, depressed compared to healthy individuals are characterized by a 
reduced attention processing of positive social signals, such as others’ happy faces (Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2012), and conversely by an increased attention processing of negative social signals, 
such as others’ sad and disgusted faces (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, 
LeMoult, & Joormann, 2013; Sanchez, Romero & De Raedt, 2017). These attentional biases have 
been shown to contribute to inefficient behavioral and emotional regulation during social 
interactions (Sanchez et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, the way facial signals of emotion are identified and interpreted may also 
determine the production and regulation of affective states and behaviors in response to them 
(Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003). Whereas an adequate identification of emotions in 
facial expressions provides crucial information to adequately adjust behavior to the interpersonal 
environment, biased facial emotion identification may lead to detrimental interpersonal 
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interactions (Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1999). Therefore, it has been proposed that not only biased 
attention processing but also misinterpretation of emotional facial signals might be underlying 
interpersonal impairments in depression (Geerts & Bouhuys, 1998). Growing research has started 
to examine the link between the ability to identify emotional expressions and depression. In 
standard experiments, pictures of real actors or schematic faces depicting different prototypical 
emotions are shown, and participants have to categorize the emotion depicted and/or judge its 
intensity. Results using this approach have been mixed (for a recent meta-analysis, see Dalili, 
Penton-Voak, Harmer, & Munafo, 2015), with some studies supporting a depression-related 
impaired ability to identify prototypical facial expressions of emotions (e.g., Gur et al., 1992; 
Persad & Polivy, 1993), but others failing to replicate those findings (e.g., Archer et al., 1992; 
Frewen & Dozois 2005).  
Given these inconsistent results, it has been argued that depressed individuals might be 
characterized by an accurate identification of prototypical high-intensity emotional expressions 
but show biases in labeling facial expressions when emotional states are more ambiguous and 
less prototypical (e.g., Beevers, Wells, Ellis, & Fischer, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2006). 
Clarifying this question seems essential, as individuals most usually encounter subtle rather than 
fully intense or clearly prototypical emotional expressions in everyday social interactions. Initial 
research began testing this question by presenting both unambiguous (clearly expressed negative 
or clearly expressed positive emotions) and ambiguous (mixed similar amount of expressed 
negative-positive emotions) schematic faces, and asking participants to rate how strongly each 
schematic depicted positive and/or negative emotions. Results showed that depression was 
associated with rating of mixed negative-positive schematic pictures as more negative (Bouhuys 
et al., 1999; Geerts & Bouhuys, 1998; Hale, 1998), and that such bias was associated with higher 
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rumination levels (Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006) and predicted persistence of depression 
across time (Bouhuys et al., 1999; Geerts & Bouhuys, 1998).  
Although these initial findings points to a depression-related negative bias in the 
identification of emotions in mixed negative-positive faces, results relied on the use of simple, 
schematic drawing of facial expressions. Further research requires using more ecologically valid 
stimuli (human facial expressions) varying in their degree in the negative-positive continuum. 
Beevers et al. (2010) presented a series of sad and fearful human faces morphed with happy faces 
of the same actors to varying degrees in the negative-positive continuum to dysphoric and non-
dysphoric individuals. Consistent with the assumption of an unimpaired prototypical emotional 
identification, groups did not differ in the identification of clearly prototypical expressions of 
those emotions. However, depression-related differences emerged in the identification of facial 
expressions depicting mixed negative-positive emotions. First, dysphoric individuals were more 
likely to identify sadness when viewing mixed sad-happy expressions. In contrast, dysphoric 
individuals were less likely to identify happiness in mixed fear-happy expressions. These results 
indicate that depression-related differences in the identification of mixed negative-positive facial 
expressions may vary depending on the nature of the negative emotion depicted, with more 
negative labeling when mixed faces depict mood-congruent negative emotions (sadness) but less 
positive labeling when they depict signals of physical threat (fear). However, both fearful and sad 
faces signal internal negative states within other persons. It seems likely that facial signals 
conveying negative relational information (e.g., personal rejection from others, as opposite to 
personal acceptance) may be highly relevant to depressed individuals (Gilboa-Schechtman, Ben-
Artzi, Jeczemien, Marom, & Hermesh, 2004).  
 In the present study, we examined depression-related processes of emotional 
identification in the negative-positive continuum using disgusted (i.e., rejecting) and happy (i.e., 
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accepting) faces. We focused on the emotion of disgust, as current research points out a great 
perception of social threat for disgust faces (e.g., Amir et al., 2005). Furthermore, recent findings 
indicate a depression-related bias in attention processing of disgusted over happy faces during the 
confrontation of social interactions (Sanchez et al., 2017). A sample of individuals reporting a 
broad range of depression severity levels performed a task where they had to rate the emotions 
depicted in pictures representing clearly prototypical facial expressions of disgust and happiness, 
as well as in pictures representing morphed facial expressions of both emotions. We focused on 
50% disgust – 50% happy morphed faces, as they represent the most ambiguous degree between 
both emotions in the negative-positive continuum.  
Different to Beevers et al. (2010), who used a two-label forced-choice paradigm (i.e., 
indicate whether the facial expression is negative or positive), a three-label paradigm of response 
was employed, including an intermediate category (i.e., indicate whether the facial expression is 
1) clearly negative, 2) mixed: not clearly negative nor clearly positive, or 3) clearly positive). 
Whereas a two-label paradigm may be adequate to index the emotional categorization of 
prototypical emotional expressions, it complicates to adequately index the perception of different 
levels of negative and positive emotions in mixed expressions. Kellough and Knight (2012) have 
shown that by asking participants to freely assign both positive and negative labels to 
propotypical and mixed negative-positive emotional faces, mixed expressions are identified as 
more negative than prototypical positive expressions and as more positive than prototypical 
negative expressions. Therefore, by using a three-label paradigm we were able to use a more 
ecologically valid procedure of emotional categorization that allowed to separately testing two 
different aspects of emotional identification. First, by using a forced-choice paradigm, we were 
able to test participants’ accuracy in the labeling of prototypical picture categories (clearly 
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negative and clearly positive expressions) to its corresponding emotion label (i.e., “clearly 
negative”, “clearly positive”, respectively). This served to test the hypothesis of an unimpaired 
identification of prototypical emotions in depression (Beevers et al., 2010). Second, by 
introducing a three-label paradigm we were able to analyze the probability of identifying 
different emotion labels in mixed emotional expressions (i.e., probability of identifying mixed 
expressions as clearly disgusted or as clearly happy, instead of as mixed). This enabled to analyze 
whether depression is associated with 1) a higher identification of disgust or 2) with a lower 
identification of happiness in mixed disgusted-happy expressions, as documented for other 
emotions in the negative-positive continuum (sad-happy, fear-happy faces, respectively; Beevers 
et al., 2010).  
2. Material and Methods 
2.1 Participants 
Participants with minimal to severe depressive symptoms were sampled from the Ghent 
University research participant pool based on a prescreening measure (Mood and Anxiety 
Symptom Questionnaire; Clark & Watson, 1991). At testing, 39 individuals  (36 female; age range: 
18-36) reported a broad range of depressive symptom severity levels (range: 0–42, M=11.28, 
SD=10.50) on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Dutch translation: 
Van der Does, 2002), with 25 individuals reporting minimal (20: 0-9; 5: 10-13), 7 mild (14-19), 4 
moderate (20-28), and 3 severe symptom levels (29-63).  All participants were native Dutch 
speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They provided informed consent and were 
paid 15 euro. The study was approved by the faculty ethical review board at Ghent University. 
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2.2 Depressive Symptom Severity 
The BDI-II assessed depressive symptom severity. On 21 items rated on a four-point scale, 
respondents indicated the extent to which they suffered from depressive symptoms in the past two 
weeks. This measure has good reliability and validity in both healthy and depressed samples (Beck 
et al., 1996; Van der Does, 2002). The internal consistency in this study was α=.95.1  
2.3 Emotion Identification Task 
2.3.1 Stimuli 
Stimuli comprised 8 computer-generated facial models (4 male and 4 female models) 
created with FaceGen Modeller 3.9. (Singular Inversions, Toronto, ON, Canada), which allows to 
build and modulate realistic emotional facial expressions on the basis of the FACS system 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Two faces were then first created for each model, respectively 
expressing full-blown emotions of happiness and disgust. Then, a morphing procedure was used 
to mix the two emotional faces in order to obtain mixed emotional expressions (50% happiness – 
50% disgust), leading to three faces (100% disgusted, 50%-50% mixed, 100% happy) per model 
(see Figure 1) and a total of 24 stimuli. All stimuli were then standardized using Photoshop 15.1: 
they were placed on a black background, resized to a 400 × 400 pixels format with a resolution of 
96 ppm (stimuli subtended a visual angle of 8 × 4 degrees). 
                                                          
1 Given that high levels of general anxiety and social anxiety are common among individuals with high depressive 
symptom severity (e.g., Kessler et al., 1996), the study also included the control of anxiety measures as covariates. 
Further evaluation included self-reported measures of trait and state anxiety, with the Trait-State Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI, Spielberger et al., 1970), as well as of fear of negative evaluation (a common symptom in social anxiety), 
with the Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (FNE: Watson and Friend, 1969). Trait and state anxiety as well as fear of 
negative evaluation were highly correlated with depressive symptom severity in our study: r= .85, p= .001; r= .77, 
p= .001; r= .42, p= .008, respectively. Further analyses were conducted including anxiety measures as covariates in 
the main analyses (see footnote 2), as well as partial correlations controlling for anxiety measures, in order to 
replicate the findings obtained in the main analyses (see footnote 3). 
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2.3.2 Procedure  
Pictures were successively shown on a computer screen and participants were instructed to 
identify the emotion expressed by the face, by indicating whether they perceived it as “clearly 
disgusted”, “mixed: not clearly disgusted nor clearly happy”, or “clearly happy”. Each trial began 
with a central fixation cross presented for 500 ms. The picture (5.8 x 7.5 cm) was then presented 
on the screen along with the three labels: 1 – disgusted, 2 – not disgusted nor happy, 3 – happy. 
Participants then selected which label best described the emotion expressed in the picture by 
pressing the appropriate key. Once participants rated the picture, the next trial began. The rating 
task comprised a total of 24 trials. Images were presented in a different randomized order for 
each participant. 
 
Figure 1. Example of model representing the three possible picture emotion categories. 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Statistical approach 
The data-analytic strategy comprised the evaluation of the role of depressive symptom 
severity in the level of emotional identification across the disgust-happiness continuum for each 
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emotional picture category (i.e., 100% disgusted, 50%-50% mixed and 100% happy expressions). 
Emotional identification indices were computed based on Beevers et al. (2010): First, cases 
labeled as “clearly disgusted” were scored as 0, cases labeled as “mixed” were scored as 0.5, and 
cases labeled as “clearly happy were scored as 1. Then, the emotional identification index for 
each type of emotional picture category was derived by averaging their scores, with the resulting 
indices varying within a range from 0 (identification of all expressions in that emotional category 
as “clearly negative”) to 1 (identification of all expressions in that emotional category as “clearly 
positive”), allowing to test participants’ accuracy in the labeling of prototypical picture 
categories. Whereas Beevers et al. (2010) used this formula to compute emotional identification 
biases using a two-forced choice paradigm (e.g., indicate whether expressions were identified as 
“negative” = score 0, or as “positive” = score 1, and then compute the average of those scores for 
each emotional category), their two-label approach did not allow to account for intermediate 
labels (i.e., identification of mixed negative-positive emotions in the expressions), being less 
suitable to interpret results in the identification of mixed negative-positive emotional categories. 
The inclusion of a third label in our study (“mixed”) allowed to derive a more precise estimation 
of biases in the emotional identification of mixed expressions, with scores around 0.5 indicating 
identification of the expressions in that category as mixed, and scores bellow and above 0.5 
indicating biases to perceive more negative and positive emotions in the mixed expressions, 
respectively. 
To increase the statistical power in our analyses, we first conducted a repeated measures 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of the emotional identification indices, with emotional 
category (“clearly disgusted”, “ mixed”, “clearly happy” pictures) as within-subject factor and 
depressive symptom severity level as covariate. This analysis served to examine the main 
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differences in emotional identification between emotional categories across the whole sample as 
well as the depression severity level by emotional picture category interaction . P-values were 
Greenhouse–Geisser corrected to address violation of the assumption of sphericity. When there 
was a significant interaction between depressive symptom severity and emotional category in the 
ANCOVA, the interaction was decomposed via separate correlations tests for each type of 
emotional picture category. Bivariate Pearson correlations were performed, separately testing the 
hypothesis of an unimpaired identification of prototypical emotions in depression (research 
question 1: correlations between depressive symptom severity and emotional identification levels 
for clearly disgusted and clearly happy expressions), and whether depression is associated with 
higher identification of disgust / lower identification of happiness in mixed disgusted-happy 
expressions (research question 2: correlations between depressive symptom severity and 
emotional identification levels for mixed expressions).  
3. Results 
 Mean and standard deviations for the emotional identification indices of each picture 
emotional category are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Mean and standard deviations of emotional identification for each picture category in the 
total sample 
 
Picture Category 
100% disgusted 
M ( SD) 
50% disgusted – 50 % happy 
M ( SD) 
100% happy 
M ( SD) 
0.05 (0.08) 0.70 (0.15) 0.96 (0.05) 
 
 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation 
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The ANCOVA, with picture emotional category (100% disgusted, 50% disgusted – 50 % 
happy, and 100% happy pictures) and depressive symptom severity as covariate, showed a 
significant main effect of picture emotional category, F(1.62,60.11) = 474.06, p = .001, p 2 = 
.93. Post-hoc comparisons showed that 100% disgusted expressions were labeled as more 
negative than both 50% disgusted – 50 % happy and 100% happy pictures, and 100% happy 
pictures were labeled as more positive than 50% disgusted – 50 % happy pictures, all p’s = .001. 
Further paired-samples t-tests of each emotional identification index against a value of 0.5 (i.e., 
indicative of identification of mixed/similar level of negative and positive emotions) showed that 
participants rated 100% disgusted pictures as “negative” (i.e., significantly below the 0.5 criteria, 
t(38)= -33.19, p= .001) and 100% happy pictures as “positive” (i.e., significantly above the 0.5 
criteria, t(38)= 61.70, p= .001). Furthermore, although at a lower level than for 100% happy 
pictures, participants also rated 50% disgusted – 50 % happy pictures as positive (i.e., 
significantly above the 0.5 criteria, t(38)= 8.65, p= .001), indicating a positive bias to perceive a 
higher level of positive than negative emotions in mixed expressions.  
Furthermore, the main effect of the depressive symptom severity covariate in the 
ANCOVA was found to reach significance, F(1,37) = 6.64, p = .014, p2 = .15. Importantly, 
there was also a significant depressive symptom severity by picture emotional category 
interaction., F(1.62,60.11) = 4.64, p = .013, p2 = .11.2 To further investigate this interaction 
effect, bivariate correlation coefficients between depressive symptom severity and emotional 
identification indices for each picture emotional category were calculated. First, regarding to the 
                                                          
2 Further ANCOVAs were conducted introducing trait and state anxiety and their interaction, as well as fear of 
negative evaluation as covariates in the model.  Different to depressive symptom level, neither trait and state anxiety 
nor their interaction accounted for main effects in picture emotional category, all F’s < 1.61, all p’s > .20, all p2 < 
.05. Similarly, fear of negative evaluation did not significantly interacted with picture emotional category, 
F(1.62,60.11) = 1.69, p = .19, p2 = .04. 
13 
 
role of depression in emotional identification of prototypical expressions (research question 1), 
analyses showed that higher depression scores were not significantly associated with differential 
levels of emotional identification of 100% disgusted pictures, r = -.27, p = .10, or 100% happy 
pictures, r =.09, p = .60. Therefore, the hypothesis of an unimpaired identification of prototypical 
emotional expressions in depression was supported both for expressions of disgust and happiness. 
Second, regarding to the role of depression in the emotional identification of mixed disgusted-
happy faces (research question 2), higher depression scores were significantly associated with 
lower scores in the emotional identification of 50% disgusted – 50% happy pictures, r = -.40, p = 
.013.  
Overall, results indicated a lower positive bias in the identification of mixed expressions 
as happy at higher depression levels4. Differential levels of 50% disgusted – 50% happy pictures’ 
identification as a function of depressive symptom severity levels are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Despite that anxiety measures did not accounted for differences in emotional identification of picture emotional 
categories, as observed in the further ANCOVAs, we aimed to replicate the main findings for depression severity 
levels after controlling for anxiety measures (i.e., trait and state anxiety , and fear of negative evaluation). A partial 
correlation controlling both for trait and state anxiety, indicated that the significant negative association between 
depression and emotional identification of 50% disgusted – 50% happy pictures  became marginally significant, r = -
.29, p = .08. In contrast, after controlling for the social anxiety measure (fear to negative evaluations), higher 
depression scores remained significantly associated with lower levels of identification of 50% disgusted – 50% 
happy pictures as “happy”, r = -.35, p = .03. 
 
4 The distribution of BDI-II scores in our sample, by design, did not meet the assumption of normality, S-W= .86, 
df= 39, p= .001. The distribution of BDI-II scores  showed a positive skewness= 1.36, SE= 0.38, and kurtosis= 1.56, 
SE= 0.74. In order to assure that our main findings were not affected by the skewed distribution of depression 
symptom severity levels in the sample, BDI-II scores were square root transformed to meet the assumption of 
normality, S-W= .98, df= 39, p= .55, skewness= -0.23, SE= 0.38, kurtosis= -0.63, SE= 0.74, and analyses were 
repeated introducing transformed BDI-II scores as covariate. Further analyses showed that the depressive symptom 
severity by picture emotional category interaction in the ANCOVA when using transformed BDI-II scores as 
covariate remained significant, F(1.62,60.14) = 3.44, p = .04, p2 = .09. Further correlation analyses confirmed no 
associations between transformed depression scores and emotional identification of prototypical disgusted and happy 
expressions, r = -.24, p = .15, and r = .07, p = .69, respectively, and a significant association between higher 
transformed depression scores and lower identification of happiness in mixed expressions, r = -.35, p = .03. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of the proportions of emotional identification of each picture emotional 
category as a function of depressive symptom severity. 
 
 
 
Notes. Pearson correlation coefficients * p<.05; ** p<.01 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
The present study aimed to clarify the role of depression in the identification of emotional 
signals with a direct interpersonal value (disgusted-rejecting as opposite to happy-accepting 
faces), thus offering a direct exploration of social interaction biases in depression. 
The hypothesis of an unimpaired identification of prototypical emotions in depression 
(Beevers et al., 2010) was confirmed both for clearly disgusted and happy expressions. 
Consistently with previous findings (e.g., Beevers et al., 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2006), 
participants in our study demonstrated an accurate identification of prototypical expressions, not 
affected by differences in depressive symptom severity levels. In contrast, depression level 
specifically accounted for differences in labeling facial expressions when emotional states were 
ambiguous (mixed disgusted-happy facial expressions). Our results showed a positive bias to 
identify mixed disgusted-happy facial expressions as “clearly positive” in the sample, with this 
bias being significantly lower at higher depression levels (see Figure 2). Therefore, with regard to 
the question on whether depression is associated with 1) a higher identification of disgust and/or 
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2) with a lower identification of happiness in mixed disgusted-happy expressions, the latter 
assumption was supported. Our results contrast with previous studies using schematic faces, 
where it has been shown a negative bias in depression consisting on a higher identification of 
negative emotions in mixed negative-positive expressions (Bouhuys et al., 1999; Geerts & 
Bouhuys, 1998; Hale, 1998). However, using more ecologically valid stimuli (human facial 
expressions), Beevers et al. (2010) have demonstrated a similar depression-related negative bias 
of higher identification of negative emotions in mixed expressions conveying mood-congruent 
states (i.e., sadness), but a different pattern consisting on lower identification of positive emotions 
when mixed expressions conveyed signals of physical threat (i.e. fear). Consistently, in our study 
a lower identification of happiness in mixed expression conveying social threat signals (i.e., 
disgust) was associated with higher depression levels. Taken together, these results might be 
indicative of differential processes of emotional identification in mixed emotions as a function of 
the nature of negative signals in the environment: Whereas depression might be associated with a 
negative bias to selectively perceive mood-congruent negative states in ambiguous or mixed 
emotional states from others (i.e., sadness), they might lack a positive bias to selectively perceive 
positive states when ambiguous or mixed states from others include signals of threat (i.e., 
disgust).  
On one hand, depressed individuals may be characterized by a biased identification of 
subtle negative emotions in others that are congruent with their mood state (i.e., sadness; Beevers 
et al., 2010). Joormann and Gotlib (2006) explored this possibility by using an innovative design 
in which participants were presented with a sequence of faces that expressed increasing degrees 
of emotional intensity, slowly changing from a neutral to a full-intensity sad, angry or happy 
expression. Participants were instructed to stop the sequence when they could identify an 
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emotion. Interestingly, depressed individuals required less intensity to identify sadness in 
comparison to anger in others’ facial expressions, indicating a readiness to perceive mood-
congruent negative states over other types of negative states in others. These results are congruent 
with Beck’s (1976) prediction of content specificity, by which a negative bias in depression 
would occur for information congruent with depressed individuals’ mood state.  
On the other hand, our results suggest that, in absence of negative mood-congruent 
information (i.e., sadness) depression would be associated with a lower perception of positive 
emotions from others when confronted with subtle or mixed negative social information (i.e., 
disgust). In the context of social threat, such lower positive bias in the identification of mixed 
emotions might account for differential processes of interpretation of social interactions. Previous 
research has shown that healthy individuals are characterized by a positive inferential bias to 
favor positive interpretations of ambiguous social situations (see, for instance, Hirsch & 
Mathews, 1997, 2000). In contrast, these studies have also shown that individuals characterized 
by social interaction impairments (in the context of social anxiety) were characterized by a 
balanced generation of threatening and positive interpretations (i.e., absence of healthy 
individuals’ positive bias) rather than by a negative bias favoring threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous situations. This evidence has been extended to the context of depression by Moser, 
Huppert, Foa, and Simmons (2012), who tested interpretation biases for socially ambiguous 
scenarios, separately in individuals meeting diagnostic criteria for social phobia, major 
depression disorder/dysthymia, and both comorbid social phobia and depression diagnoses, in 
comparison to healthy controls. In this study, healthy controls showed a positive interpretation 
bias both at a behavioral level (i.e., faster reaction times to unsolved ambiguity into a positive vs. 
a negative interpretation) and a neural level (i.e., event-related potentials, ERP: enhanced  N4 
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amplitudes for negative than for positive solutions of the social ambiguity). However, the three 
clinical groups, including clinically depressed individuals without social phobia comorbidity, 
were characterized by absence of the ‘healthy’ positive interpretation bias, as observed both in 
their reaction times and their ERPs when solving social ambiguity. Since real social interactions 
rarely provide clear evidence of rejection or acceptance from others, such ultimate interpretation 
and its impact in emotional response might be dependent on individuals’ perception of social 
signals in the environment. The positive bias to perceive mixed disgusted-happy expressions as 
clearly happy observed at lower depression levels in our study might, in turn, facilitate a biased 
positive interpretation of ambiguous social environments in healthy individuals, as suggested by 
Hirsch and Mathews (1997, 2000) and Moser et al. (2012). A higher propensity to generate more 
positive interpretations of ambiguous scenarios would act as an adaptive mechanism facilitating 
resilience against stress and protecting from depression (e.g., Kleim, Thörn, & Ehlert, 2014). In 
contrast, the lower perception of positive emotions in mixed rejecting-accepting social signals 
observed at higher levels of depression in our study might lead to a more balanced interpretation 
of socially ambiguous scenarios, as observed both in depression and other problems reflecting 
social impairments (Hirsch and Mathews, 1997, 2000; Moser et al. (2012). Of note, consistent 
with the lack of positive interpretation biases for social ambiguous information in depression 
even in absence of social anxiety comorbidity (Moser et al., 2012), further analyses in or study 
confirmed the evidence for an association between depression and a lower positive identification 
bias for mixed/ambiguous expressions, even after statistically controlling for co-varying social 
anxiety symptoms (i.e., fear to negative evaluations). Taking these results together, a possible 
explanation on why depressed individuals may end up attributing to themselves more negative 
social performance and more negative outcomes from balanced social contexts, might be that in 
absence of protective positive biases for external social information, they ignore external social 
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signals and rely instead on internal sources of information (i.e., negative beliefs about oneself, 
independently of perceived-interpreted external evidence in the social environment) to form their 
social judgments. This open question require further research to clarify the interplays between 
socio-emotional identification and interpretation processes and their role in social performance 
and post-social events evaluation. 
However, further research should first clarify the differential emotional identification 
patterns reported for different mixed negative-positive emotions by Beevers et al. (2010) and the 
present study (i.e., negative bias for mixed sad-happy faces, absence of positive bias for mixed 
disgusted-happy faces). A limitation in our study is that we only examined the disgust-happiness 
continuum and, therefore, it cannot be determined whether the results found using our 
methodology would reflect a social-specific bias or are part of a broader, more generalized lack 
of positive bias in the emotional identification of mixed negative-positive facial expressions in 
depression. Of particular relevance, it remains to be tested whether an opposite depression-related 
negative bias in the sadness-happiness continuum would also be observed using our 
methodological approach. Whether depression may be characterized by a biased identification of 
sadness in mixed sad-happy faces (in contrast to a non-biased identification of happiness in 
mixed disgusted-happy faces) will require methods allowing indexing multiple levels of 
categorical perception, as done in our study. Another limitation is that most of the participants in 
our sample were women, which may limit the generalizability of the results. Furthermore, the 
non-clinical nature of the recruited sample also limits to some extent the generalizability of our 
findings. Further investigation is needed across different samples representing the depression 
course, including clinically depressed individuals, in order to clarify whether lower identification 
of happiness in mixed disgusted-happy expressions is replicated in clinical depression and the 
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implications of this lack of positive bias. Whereas several studies have proven a bias in clinically 
depressed individuals to easily detect sadness in mixed sad-neutral expressions (see Dalili et al., 
2015), the experience/lack of biases in the identification of mixed positive-negative social signals 
remains to be tested. Finally, whereas our study and previous research have focused in evaluating 
the emotional identification of single individually presented prototypical or mixed emotional 
expressions, the social environment usually involves interactions with multiple others’ reflecting 
dynamically changing levels in their emotional states and their intensities. Further research must 
consider how emotional identification processes operate in depression in the context of more 
complex and ecologically valid social environments (both single and multiple sources of 
prototypical and mixed emotions in dynamic change).  
In sum, the results in this study promise to increase the current knowledge on social 
interaction biases in depression. The methodology employed served to clarify the conditions 
under which emotional identification biases occurs during the processing of interpersonally 
relevant emotion signals (disgust/rejection-happiness/acceptance continuum). Our results suggest 
that depression may account for a lower positive bias to selectively perceive positive states when 
viewing mixed positive-negative interpersonal states from others. Such under-perception of 
positive emotional states in others’ mixed expressions may have important implications for the 
evaluation of social signals and, therefore, for social functioning.   
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